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14.1  Introduction 
The United Europe of  1992 and the attempt to form the North American 
Free Trade Area (NAFTA) tell us that the world is under a new tide of regional- 
ism. We  hope that the tidal wave  will not result in the formation of  highly 
protective regional blocs, as the phrase “Fortress Europe” might suggest, but 
that these are moves toward an integrated world economy with free trade. In 
any case, a series of questions arises: Will Asian countries form an economic 
bloc in the near future? Will the Association of  South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) create a more integrated economic community? Will the plan to 
form the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) or Group (EAEG) be realized? 
Is it practical to conceive of a currency union in East Asia? 
In fact, Asian nations have now begun to move toward the creation of a free 
trade area (FTA). For example, in November 1991, the Asian-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Minister Conference agreed that it would promote free 
trade within the region; in January 1992, the summit meeting of ASEAN de- 
cided to create an FTA. Are these steps toward Asian economic integration 
desirable for Asia? 
The political aspects of these questions are far from simple. First, the United 
States may oppose the creation of  an FTA  in Asia that would restrict export 
flows from the United States to this area, as it has already indicated by  its 
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response to the plan for the EAEC or EAEG. Second, the idea of  including 
Japan in an Asian bloc may  invoke complex and ambivalent, if  not entirely 
hostile, reactions by many nations in the region, because it triggers memories 
of  the infamous “co-prosperity area” formed under Japan’s lead during World 
war 11. 
In his prize-winning essay, Jeffrey Frankel (1991) notes that the Japanese 
government is not necessarily taking a positive stance toward the formation of 
a yen bloc in Asia or East Asia. This reluctance reflects Japan’s delicate politi- 
cal position, a legacy of  the past. It corresponds to the low political profile 
maintained by Germany, despite its economic affluence. 
This paper does not address the political feasibility of  any form of Asian 
economic integration, nor does it intend to advocate any. Rather, we present a 
general assessment of economic conditions in Asia as a preliminary step to a 
discussion of the issues involved in such an integration. While Frankel (1991) 
focused on the question of  Japan’s influence in the region, we shall examine 
various statistical indicators in order to assess how closely the Asian national 
economies are interrelated. We  shall attempt to discover whether conditions in 
the Asian economies are favorable or unfavorable for the creation of an FTA 
or a common currency area and, specifically, whether the Asian economies are 
more or less homogeneous than those of the European Community, which are 
moving toward economic unification. 
In section 14.2, we will review selected macroeconomic indicators for the 
East Asian nations, trace how closely their movements coincide, and examine 
how closely they are interrelated. In other words, we will assess the degree of 
homogeneity and the degree of  economic proximity in Asia. Then we will 
compare them with those in Europe. 
In section 14.3, we will study whether the region meets preconditions for an 
FTA or FTAs by examining trade intensity indices among Asian nations. Since 
the conventional  trade intensity index captures the degree of closeness in terms 
of  trade only relative to the size of  its trading partner and not the absolute 
degree of  dependence of  a country on trade with its partner, we will supple- 
ment the trade intensity index with an alternative measure, the trade depen- 
dence index, which indicates the importance of a trading partner. 
In order to assess conditions for creating an FTA, we have to know not only 
how  closely nations  are  interwoven by  trade,  but  also how  their import- 
competing industries are protected by tariffs and other barriers. We will study 
the degree of protection. The more nations protect their import-competing  in- 
dustries, the greater the trade-creating effect of the formation of an FTA. 
In section 14.4, we will review conditions for creating a currency union in 
Asia. Thanks to the theory of an optimal currency area initiated by Mundell 
(1961), we have more criteria by  which to judge the appropriateness of the 
formation of a common currency area than we do to judge that of an FTA. We 
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real and nominal, and the ease of factor movements among nations within the 
region. 
In section 14.5, we will summarize the results and possible policy implica- 
tions. As a tentative conclusion, we may say that the degree of interdependence 
among Asian nation is high, even higher in some respects than among EC 
countries. Preconditions for an FTA in this region are satisfied. However, since 
Asian countries depend heavily on trade with the United States and Japan, an 
FTA  that hinders trade with these countries would not be practical. Precondi- 
tions for a currency union in Asia are also met. In such a currency union, it is 
not clear whether the Asian countries would benefit from linking their common 
currency to a major currency such as the dollar or the yen. 
14.2  Confluence in Macroeconomic Variables in Asia 
As a prelude to a discussion of  the feasibility of  economic integration in 
Asia, let us review key macroeconomic indicators in East Asian countries, in- 
cluding both the Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) and ASEAN 
countries and then compare them with corresponding indicators in other re- 
gions. Table 14.1 summarizes the main economic indicators for selected coun- 
tries. From a quick glance at this table, one sees that an East Asian nation can 
be characterized as a high-income, rapidly growing economy with a relatively 
stable price level (especially in the 1980s). The Philippines in the mid-1980s 
Table 14.1  Main Economic Indicators for Selected Countries 
GNP per Capita  Inflation Rate (%) 
Population  (US. $)  Growth Rate (%) 
Country  (million)  (1988)  (1965-88)  (1965-80)  (1980-88) 
Hong Kong  5.7  9,220  6.3  8.1  6.7 
Korea  42.0  3,600  6.8  18.7  5.0 
Singapore  2.6  9,070  7.2  4.9  1.2 
Taiwan  20.1  6,333  8.9'  10.4b  4.7 
Indonesia  174.8  440  4.3  34.2  8.5 
Malaysia  16.9  1,940  4.0  4.9  1.3 
Philippines  59.9  630  1.6  11.7  15.6 
Thailand  54.5  1 ,m  4.0  6.3  3.1 
United States  246.3  19,840  1.6  6.5  4.0 
Japan  122.6  2 1,020  4.3  7.7  1.3 
Worle  4,736.2  3.4706  1  Sd  9.gd  14.1d 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report I990 (Washington,  D.C.); Taiwan Kenkyu Sho, 
Taiwan Soran (Taiwan Statistical Data Book), 1991. 
"1970-90. 
b1970-80. 
Total countries reporting data to the World Bank. 
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is a notable exception. In 1984 and 1985, the consumer  price level in the Philip- 
pines increased by  50.3 and 23.1 percent, respectively. In the same period, 
during which the country experienced severe political unrest, real GNP de- 
clined by  almost 10 percent in the annual average rate. All other East Asian 
nations enjoyed good economic performance throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
In order to elaborate the above statement somewhat more rigorously, we 
conducted t-tests on three macroeconomic indicators: inflation, growth, and 
investment. We compared the sample mean of each variable in eight East Asian 
countries with those in  15 developed countries as well as with those in  20 
developing countries. Table 14.2 compares the sample means of the three vari- 
ables in East Asian countries with those in 20 developing countries. The East 
Asian countries in the following discussion include both the Asian NIEs and 
ASEAN countries: Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malay- 
sia, the Philippines, and Thailand. A second, control, group of less-developed 
countries (LDCs) includes Mexico, Algeria, C8te d' Ivoire, Ghana, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Zaire, Egypt, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
Table 14.2 shows the sample means and the standard errors of difference in 
means of the three variables during 1970-90. The table indicates that the East 
Asian countries enjoyed significantly lower inflation, higher economic growth, 
and more active investment than the 20 control-group  LDCs. While many Latin 
American countries suffered from hyperinflation, as high as 500-1000 percent 
per annum during the 1980s, annual rates of  increase in consumer prices in 
East Asia were in most cases less than 10 percent, with the aforementioned 
exception of the Philippines. With this price stability, real GNP grew rapidly. 
While the average economic growth rate in the control-group LDCs was 3.4 
percent, in the East Asian countries it was 7.4 percent, more than twice as high. 
This rapid growth was not limited to the NIEs (i.e., Hong Kong, Korea, Tai- 
Table 14.2  Sample Means for Selected Macroeconomic Variables: Asia versus 
Control-Group  Less-Developed Countries 
~~  ~~  ~~ 
Variable  Asia"  Control LDCb  Difference  Standard Error 
Inflationc  8.829  96.299  -87.470*  36.818 
Growthd  7.421  3.352  4.069**  0.467 
Investmenr  26.841  20.234  6.607**  0.714 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., various issues). 
"ong  Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand. 
'Mexico, Algeria, C6te d'Ivoire, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Zaire, Egypt, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Ar- 
gentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. 
'Change in consumer price index (%). 
dChange in real GDP (GNP)  (%). 
'Ratio of investment to GDP (GNP) (YO). 
*Significant at 95 percent level. 
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Table 14.3  Sample Means for Selected Macroeconomic  Variables: Asia versus 
Developed Countries 
Variable  Asia"  Developed  Difference  Standard Error 
Inflation"  8.829  8.813  0.016  0.674 
Growthd  7.421  3.078  4.343**  0.309 
Investmenr  26.841  22.081  4.760**  0.520 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., various issues). 
'Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand. 
bUnited States, Japan, Canada, and 12 EC countries. 
Change in consumer price index (%). 
dChange in real GDP (GNP) (%). 
'Ratio  of investment to GDP (GNP) (%). 
**Significant at 99 percent level. 
wan, and Singapore). For example, economic growth rates in Malaysia and 
Thailand in 1990 exceeded 10 percent. 
The third row of the table shows the degree of investment activity (the ratio 
of fixed capital formation to total GDP). While investment activities were stag- 
nant in the control-group LDCs during the 1980s, investment in East Asia ac- 
celerated in that period, and it has shown no sign of slowdown in recent years. 
Active investment in East Asia suggests that even faster economic growth may 
be realized in this region in the future. 
Since the 20 LDC countries in the control group were suffering to varying 
degrees from recent economic difficulties, a comparison with these LDCs may 
not necessarily prove the good economic performance of East Asian nations. 
Hence, we also compared the same macroeconomic indicators for East Asia 
with those for developed countries including the United States, Japan, Canada, 
and 12 EC countries (see table 14.3). The comparison with developed coun- 
tries, however, shows again the East Asia was  growing dynamically under 
stable prices. Economic performance in East Asia was generally better, not 
only than other developing countries, but also than our group of  developed 
countries, which includes such economic superstars as Germany and Japan. 
Although there is no significant difference in the inflation rates in the two 
groups, economic growth rates were significantly higher and investment sig- 
nificantly more active in East Asia than in developed countries. Thus, from 
their economic performance during the 1970s and 1980s, the East Asian na- 
tions can be characterized as a group of dynamically growing economies with 
stable price levels. 
Let us now ask how homogeneous macroeconomic variables are in the East 
Asian region and by what standard one can judge whether the Asian nations 
have similar economic structures. If we were interested in the degree of inter- 
dependence between a pair of  variables, we would naturally be interested in 
the correlation coefficient between them. However, in studying the degree of 364  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
coherence in a group of more than two variables, the correlation coefficient 
does not help much. The canonical correlation between groups of  variables 
gives a measure of correlation between the groups, but not the degree of con- 
fluence within a single group. Neither does regression analysis among vari- 
ables make much sense. 
There are alternative methods of measuring the degree of  confluence. For 
example, the dissimilarity index (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 1990) and the Ma- 
halanobis D2 (Mahalanobis 1936) could be useful devices. In this paper we 
apply principal component analysis to measure the degree of confluence in 
macroeconomic time series in the Asian countries. The principal components 
of a set of m variables are a set of m artificially constructed variables that are 
mutually orthogonal linear combinations of the original variables. The first 
component explains as much as possible of the total variance of  the original 
variables, the second explains as much as possible of the variance that is left 
unexplained by  the first, and so forth. We  propose to measure the degree of 
confluence in variables by the ratio of the variance explained by the first com- 
ponent to the total variance. 
The rationale is as follows: If a set of variables is perfectly correlated, the 
first (or any) component explains all of the variance. If they are mutually inde- 
pendent and have identical variance, the first component explains llm of the 
total variance. In general, the ratio of  the variance explained by  a principal 
component to the total variance is equal to the value of the characteristic root 
of the correlation matrix corresponding to the component divided by m. 
As is well known, possible problems remain in this approach. The principal 
components are not independent of the scaling of the variables; it is hard to 
interpret principal components in economic terms, even though factor analysis, 
which is closely related to the principal component method, provides a way to 
interpret them. In spite of  these potential problems, the principal component 
method seems to be a useful tool that effectively serves our objectives. In fact, 
Stone (1945) utilized principal component analysis to clarify the structure of 
income and outlay in the United States by economizing on the number of vari- 
ables, and Adelman and Moms (1967) used factor analysis to classify devel- 
oping countries by the similarity of their social, economic, and political char- 
acteristics. 
We apply principal component analysis to five key macroeconomic variables 
in the East Asian countries-change  in money supply (M,),  interest rate, infla- 
tion rate, economic growth rate, and investment activity-in  order to evaluate 
the degree of  confluence of  these variables within the region. We  solve the 
characteristic equation of the correlation matrix of macroeconomic variables. 
The principal components are normalized in such a way that they have zero 
mean and unitary variance. 
Table 14.4 summarizes for each macroeconomic variable the proportion of 
its total variation among the eight East Asian countries (exactly speaking, 
seven for money supply and interest rate because the data for Hong Kong were 365  Economic  Preconditions for Asian Regional Integration 
Table 14.4  Principal Component (P.C.) Analysis of Selected Macroeconomic 
Variables (cumulative  R2) 
Variable and Component  Asia"  Larger ECb  Smaller EC' 
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"For change in money supply and interest rate: Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand. For change in consumer price, change in real GDP, and ratio of invest- 
ment  in  GDP:  Hong  Kong,  Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,  Indonesia,  Malaysia, Philippines,  and 
Thailand. 
bFor change in money supply and interest rate: Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain, 
the Netherlands, and Belgium. For change in consumer price, change in real GDP, and ratio of 
investment in GDP: Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Denmark. 
'For  change in money supply and interest rate: Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Denmark, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands. For change in consumer price, change in real GDP, and ratio of 
investment in GDP  Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Spain. 
unavailable) that is accounted for by the first three principal components. Thus, 
for example, with regard to the change in money supply, the first principal 
component accounts for 52.2 percent of the total variation of the seven Asian 
variables, the second for 16.8 percent (or 69.0 percent cumulatively), and the 
third for an additional 15.3 percent. 
In an attempt to grasp intuitively the degree of  confluence of macroeco- 
nomic activities among Asian countries, we  compare these values for Asia 
with those for two sets of  EC countries: the larger EC countries and the smaller 
EC countries (divided in terms of their GNP). In order to avoid a misleading 
impression due to the difference in the number of countries in each group, or 
in the degree of freedom, the number of countries in each group is set to be 
the same for each comparison. 366  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
As can be seen in table 14.4, changes in money supply are more homoge- 
neous by  far in the Asian countries than in the EC countries, which are ex- 
pected to form a single currency area in the near future. While the first princi- 
pal component accounts for more than half of the total variation of the Asian 
variables, it explains only a little more than 40 percent among variables for the 
larger EC countries and less than one third among variables for the smaller 
EC countries. 
For the remaining four variables, too, the Asian variables are found to be 
fairly homogeneous. Although the ratio of  the variance explained by the first 
component to the total variance in Asia is generally smaller than that among 
the larger EC countries, there is little difference between the ratio in Asia and 
that among the smaller EC countries. Thus in terms of these macroeconomic 
variables, East Asia is a group as homogeneous as the European Community. 
It is also interesting to consider the contribution of each additional variable 
to the principal components. For that purpose, we examine the “loading factor.” 
The loading factor equals the correlation coefficient between a principal com- 
ponent and the original variable. The sum of the squares of loading factors of 
a component equals its characteristic root. 
Table  14.5 indicates the loading factors for the first three principal compo- 
nents for five macroeconomic variables: change in money supply, interest rate, 
change in CPI, change in real GNP, and ratio of investment to GNP. Loading 
factors are also interpreted as the correlation coefficient between the principal 
component and the corresponding country variable. In order to find the affinity 
of  each principal component to two large economies, the correlation coeffi- 
cient between a principal component and the United States and Japan variables 
are reported. Needless to say, the United States and Japan are not included in 
the variable set that yields the principal component; the last two rows are re- 
ported only for reference. 
We can give the following interpretation to the loading factors of major prin- 
cipal components. Like the interpretation of factors in factor analysis, its value 
is heuristic rather than definitive. However, a close look at loading factors 
yields various clues as to the homogeneity as well as the diversity of macroeco- 
nomic activities in the region. 
1. Change in money supply: The first principal component, which explains 
about one-half of the total variance, indicates that this series consists of vari- 
ables that are rather homogeneous across the countries studied, with the pos- 
sible exception of Taiwan. This common trend shows a pattern similar to Ja- 
pan’s changes in money supply. The second principal component seems to be 
related to the difference between the money supply pattern in Indonesia, on 
one hand, and in the Philippines and Thailand, on the other. 
2. Interest rate: Loading factors of  the first components seem to suggest 
that NIEs such as Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan behave differently from other 
countries in the region, and the difference between them explains a substantial 
part of the total variance. 367  Economic Preconditions for Asian Regional Integration 
Table 14.5  Loading Factor of Each Principal Component 
Principal Component 
Variable and Country  1  2  3 
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Table 14.5  (continued) 
Principal Component 
Variable and Country  1  2  3 
Philippines  0.944  -0.241  0.131 
Singapore  0.524  -0.810  0.063 
Thailand  -0.026  0.517  0.805 
Taiwan  0.870  0.412  -0.090 
Hong Kong  0.784  0.377  0.006 
(USA)”  0.445  0.502  -0.527 
(Japan)”  0.549  0.742  0.255 
Source: See main text for detail. 
Correlation coefficients with macroeconomic variables for the United States and Japan are given 
for reference. 
3. Change in CPI: The first component indicates a generic movement that is 
at the same time closely related to movements in  CPI in  the United States 
and Japan. 
4. Change in real GNP: Here also Korea shows a different movement from 
other countries, as indicated by the first component. 
5.  Ratio of investment to GNP: Here the NIEs and the Philippines somehow 
move together, and Indonesia and Thailand have something in common.’ 
We have seen by principal component analysis that the degree of confluence 
in macroeconomic variables in eight East Asian nations is comparable to that 
in the European Community where momentum is toward market integration 
and currency unification. 
14.3  The Degree of Trade Intensity and the Rate of Protection in Asia 
In this section we  will examine to what extent Asian nations satisfy the 
preconditions for an FTA  or FTAs. Let us review first how closely Asian na- 
tions are interrelated by trade. Frankel (1991) doubts the existence of a trend 
of  increasing intraregional trade intensity. According to him, the share (37.4 
percent) of intraregional trade among Asian nations in 1989 was smaller than 
that among EC countries (59.9 percent), and there is very little difference from 
that in North America (36.0 percent). The reason for the increase in the share 
from 33 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in 1989 was merely the increase of the 
Asian share in the total trade volume in the world. He concludes, “it is likely 
that there has in fact been no movement toward intra-regional  bias in the evolv- 
1. It is interesting to see from a similar observation that in EC countries we suspect different 
patterns between Germany, on one hand, and Romance countries such as France, Italy, and Spain, 
on the other. 369  Economic Preconditions for Asian Regional Integration 
ing pattern of trade.” We will examine whether this statement reflects the Asian 
trade situation. 
In order to assess their degree of interconnectedness in trade, let us compare 
Asian nations with EC nations by  the trade intensity index which Yamazawa, 
Hirata, and Yokota (1991) have developed extensively. The trade intensity in- 
dex between country i and country j (I,)  is defined as 
qJ  =  trade volume of country i with country j, 
=  the total trade volume of country i, 
Twj  =  trade volume of the world with countryj, and 
T,  =  the total trade volume of the world. 
Accordingly, the index is the ratio of the share of trade with countryj in the 
total trade of country i to the share of countryj’s trade in total world trade. The 
index is normalized by  dividing by  the relative share of  the country in total 
world trade so that mere size effects are eliminated. If  the degree of trade 
interaction between country i and country j is equal to that between the world 
and countryj, then the index is equal to unity. The higher the index, the more 
closely the two countries are interrelated by trade. 
The rationale of  using a trade intensity index to evaluate the existence of 
preconditions for the creation of an FTA is as follows: (i) an FTA is more likely 
to be created among countries which are “natural trading partners” to each 
other, because an FTA  consisting of  natural trading partners is likely to be 
trade-creating rather than trade-diverting, and because an economic incentive 
to create one is stronger than otherwise; (ii) if  countries are natural trading 
partners to each other, they must be already closely interrelated by trade (i.e., 
the trade intensity indices among these countries should be high); (iii) hence 
(from [i] and [ii]), if trade intensity indices are high among a group of coun- 
tries, an FTA is more likely to be formed among these countries than otherwise 
when some political move is initiated. 
Tables 14.6 and 14.7 depict the trade intensity indices among Asian coun- 
tries and among EC countries, respectively. As is easily seen, those indices that 
adjust for the size effect of trading partners show in many cases higher values 
than those in the EC. For example, in the European Community those indices 
exceed three  only in  three cases, i.e.,  United  Kingdom-Ireland,  Belgium- 
Luxembourg-Netherlands,  and Italy-Greece; in East Asia they exceed three in 
nine cases, despite the fact that the number of countries in Asia (9) is smaller 
than that in the European Community (1  1). In particular, trade intensity among 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand is extremely strong. In general, Singapore 
is interrelated strongly with other East Asian countries. Furthermore, the high 
values of  the trade intensity indices with Japan indicate that Japan plays an 
important role in Asia. As far as we can tell from the levels of the trade inten- 
sity index, we  may  say that, contrary to the  impression given by  Frankel Table 14.6  lkade Intensity Indices among Asian Countries, 1990 
United  Hong 












2.10  1.23  2.15  2.13  0.44  0.90 
2.10  1.46  3.43  2.63  4.41  4.88 
1.23  1.46  1.84  3.43  0.16  1.28 
2.15  3.43  1.84  1.18  3.11  2.85 
2.13  2.63  3.43  1.18  1.29  2.71 
0.44  4.41  0.16  3.11  1.29  0.48 
0.90  4.88  1.28  2.85  2.71  0.48 
1.15  2.44  1.12  2.02  2.09  2.76  1.65 
1.95  2.57  2.27  1.84  2.71  8.47  1.57 
1.33  1.89  2.27  1.41  1.82  10.68  4.35 









































Source: IMF, Directions of  Trade Statistics (Washington, D.C., 1991). Table 14.7  lkade Intensity Indices among EC Countries, 1990 
United  United  Belgium- 
States  Japan  Kingdom  Luxembourg  Denmark  France  Germany  Italy  Netherlands  Greece  Ireland  Portugal  Spain 
United States  2.10  0.91  0.48  0.35  0.45  0.49  0.47  0.50  0.34  0.78  0.33  0.47 
Japan  2.10  0.54  0.30  0.43  0.31  0.53  0.30  0.35  0.45  0.42  0.25  0.30 
United Kingdom  0.91  0.54  1.44  1.64  1.51  1.36  1.14  1.67  1.15  6.95  1.68  1.52 
Belgium-Luxembourg  0.48  0.30  1.44  0.75  2.68  2.07  1.11  3.49  0.89  0.94  0.93  0.91 
Denmark  0.35  0.43  1.64  0.75  0.86  2.00  0.92  1.42  1.28  1.00  1.48  0.69 
France  0.45  0.31  1.51  2.68  0.86  1.82  2.32  1.44  1.34  1.17  2.01  2.79 
Germany  0.49  0.53  1.36  2.07  2.00  1.82  1.91  2.33  1.94  0.94  1.50  1.50 
Italy  0.47  0.30  1.14  1.11  0.92  2.32  1.91  1.02  3.25  0.70  1.58  2.16 
Netherlands  0.50  0.35  1.67  3.49  1.42  1.44  2.33  1.02  1.38  1.20  1.18  1.09 
Greece  0.34  0.45  1.15  0.89  1.28  1.34  1.94  3.25  1.38  0.74  0.64  0.99 
Ireland  0.78  0.42  6.95  0.94  1.00  1.17  0.94  0.70  1.20  0.74  0.76  0.83 
Portugal  0.33  0.25  1.68  0.93  1.48  2.01  1.50  1.58  1.18  0.64  0.76  7.07 
Spain  0.47  0.30  1.52  0.91  0.69  2.79  1.50  2.16  1.09  0.99  0.83  7.07 
Source: IMF, Direction of  Trade Statistics (Washington, D.C.,  1991). 372  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
(1991), the degree of trade interdependence is quite strong among Asian na- 
tions. (In fact his other study using the gravity model [Frankel 19921 confirms 
our findings.) 
Let us now turn to changes in the trade intensity indices during the 1980s. 
Table 14.8, which is cited from Yamazawa et al. (1991), indicates changes in 
trade intensity indices of exports from 1980 to 1987. The entry in the ith row 
and jth column indicates exports from country  i to country j. The index rose 
slightly from 1.598 to 1.711 among EC countries. Some of the indices among 
Asian nations increased, but  some decreased. Therefore it is  hard  to  say 
whether Asian trade intensity indices increased. As far as the trend is con- 
cerned, the trade intensity indices confirm the argument of Frankel (1991). 
In summary, though we found the level of trade intensity among Asian na- 
tions to be even higher than in the European Community, we could not neces- 
sarily detect a distinct increasing trend. This seems to reflect the fact that, 
while in the European Community several programs aimed toward market inte- 
gration were realized during the 1980s, in Asia the push toward an FTA  be- 
came active only recently. In light of recent political developments toward an 
FTA  mentioned in  the introduction, intraregional trade intensity can be ex- 
pected to increase in Asia in the 1990s, as it did in Europe in the 1980s. 
Table 14.6 appears to indicate that trade intensity between the United States 
and Asian countries is not particularly strong. The indices exceed two only 
with respect to Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. This hardly means, however, that 
the United States is not an important trading partner of  Asian nations. This 
misleading impression comes from the nature of  the trade intensity index, 
which captures the degree of  closeness in terms of trade only relative to the 
size of a country’s trading partner. It does not capture the absolute degree of a 
country’s dependence on trade with a particular partner. For example, if a small 
Asian nation has a low trade intensity index with the United States, this may 
just imply that the share of trade with the small nation in the trade volume of 
the United States is relatively small. The United States may  well be an im- 
portant trading partner of the Asian nation. Thus we have to provide an alterna- 
tive index that indicates  the degree of one nation’s dependence on trade with an- 
other. 
Table 14.9 summarizes our attempt to provide such an index. It tabulates the 
amount of exports and imports of a country with a particular trading partner as 
a percentage of the country’s GNP. For example, the third entry of the first row 
(14.86) shows that the amount of Korea’s trade with the United States ($35.6 
billion) is  14.86 percent of  Korea’s GNP ($239.8 billion). We  may  call it a 
trade dependence index, because it shows the degree to which a country de- 
pends on trade with a specific partner, or the degree to which a country would 
be jeopardized by  a trade embargo (export or import) by  a particular trading 
partner. 
Table 14.9 reveals that East Asian nations depend heavily on trade with the 
United States and with Japan. Therefore, it would be infeasible as well as un- Table 14.8  Matrix of Trade Intensity Indices, 1980 and 1987 
Importer 
United  Hong 




















































































































































































































1.71  1 
Source:  Yamazawa et al. (1991) 374  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
Table 14.9  Trade Dependence Indices: Ratio of the Amount of Trade (export 
plus import) to GNP, 1990 (%) 
Partner 
















































8.05  5.48  15.26  44.37 
39.42  23.34  27.17  137.89 
12.86  9.16  48.25  7.92 
11.42 
1.91 




Japan  2.81  4.90  17.79 
‘Singapore is included in both NIEs and ASEAN. 
bSingapore figure is shown in parentheses. 
‘Figures for 1989. 
profitable for East Asian nations to form an FTA  without the United States 
and Japan. 
Let us now examine the degree of protection in East Asian countries, be- 
cause, in order to assess the conditions for creating an FTA, we have to know 
not only how closely nations are interwoven by trade, but also how much their 
import-competing industries  are  protected by  tariff  and  nontariff  barriers 
(NTBs). Figure  14.1 compares trade-weighted average most-favored-nation 
(MFN) tariffs of six Asian nations with those of Japan and the United States. 
Except for Singapore, where the trade-weighted average tariff is very low (i.e., 
about one percent), tariffs in East Asian countries are substantially higher than 
in Japan and the United States. In particular, those in Indonesia and the Philip- 
pines are high at around 20 percent, while those in Japan and the United States 
are less than 4 percent. Thus, as is the case in most developing countries, the 
degree of tariff protection in East Asia is fairly high. 
Table 14.10 summarizes the (simple) average of tariff rates by commodities 
in East Asia. Note that the numbers in figure 14.1 are trade-weighted average 375  Economic Preconditions for Asian Regional Integration 
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Fig. 14.1  Trade-weighted average most-favored-nation  (MFN) tariff 
Table 14.10  Average Tariff Rate by Broad Tariff Categories 
Category 
Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
(1980)  (1982)  (1982)  (1983)  (1983)  ASEAN 
Primary goods  14.86  3.46  23.56  0.11  19.76  12.35 
Intermediate goods  24.94  17.04  26.65  8.62  26.96  20.84 
Capital goods (including parts, 
excluding transport 
equipment)  20.05  6.50  21.97  0.28  23.72  14.50 
Consumer goods  65.57  63.85  42.21  9.46  49.40  46.10 
Transport equipment 
(excluding passenger motor 
cars, including parts)  27.39  19.26  20.92  2.00  22.41  18.40 
Other  17.16  10.64  27.66  0.00  13.12  13.72 
Total  32.59  24.99  29.18  6.41  30.66  24.77 
Source:  Naya and Plummer, (1989) 376  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
tariff rates, which cannot be directly compared with those in table 14.10. Table 
14.10 shows that the tariff rate increases according to the degree of processing: 
consumer goods have the highest tariff rate, and primary goods the lowest. It 
should be noted that in Indonesia and Malaysia the average tariff rates for con- 
sumer goods are as high as 60 percent. 
In  addition to tariffs, import-competing industries in East Asian countries 
are heavily protected by NTBs, such as quotas, restrictive licensing, and import 
prohibition. Table 14.11, cited from Naya and Plummer (1989), indicates the 
number of NTBs by broad commodity categories in East Asia. Due to the limi- 
tation of  data, we are not able to provide here comparison with countries in 
other regions. However, table 14.11 shows that quite a few products are re- 
stricted by NTBs in these countries. In particular, the number of NTBs in Indo- 
nesia (799) and the Philippines (497) is remarkable. As is the case for tariff 
protection, NTBs seem to rise along with the degree of processing. In all coun- 
tries listed in table 14.11, the number of NTBs on manufactures is substantially 
larger than that on primary goods. 
The numbers above show that trade in East Asia, especially trade in the 
manufacturing sector, is heavily protected by both tariffs and NTBs at present. 
Therefore, if an FTA is formed among these countries, the manufacturing trade 
in the area is likely to increase substantially. The magnitude of the possible 
gains from trade liberalization among Asian countries, along with their already 
high degree of  economic interrelatedness, would seem to constitute a strong 
incentive for these nations to create an FTA (or FTAs) in East Asia. 
14.4  Conditions for a Currency Union 
Are the Asian nations or some subset of them an appropriate group of econo- 
mies for the use of a single currency, or at least for the fixing of exchange rates 
among their currencies? It  seems appropriate here to  recall how  Mundell 
(1961) started to analyze this question. If  there is neither wage-price rigidity 
nor transaction costs, the exchange rate regime may  not make a substantial 
difference because money would be neutral. This seems to be the main mes- 
sage of  the cash-in-advance model applied to the problem of exchange-rate 
regime choice (e.g., Helpman and Ruin 1979; Lucas 1982). However, if there 
Table 14.11  ASEAN Nontariff Barriers (in numbers of six-digit CCCN products 
affected) 
Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
Category  Brunei  (1980)  (1981)  (1983)  (1983)  (1983) 
Primarygoods  62  319  103  147  70  65 
Manufactures  11  480  70  350  91  118 
Total  139  199  173  491  161  184 
Source: Naya and Plummer (1989). 377  Economic Preconditions for Asian Regional Integration 
is price rigidity or transaction costs, regions that have different real exogenous 
shocks should be within different currency areas, because prices do not adjust 
enough if they are closely linked by fixed exchange rates. If, for instance, the 
Japanese island of Hokkaido and the mainland Honshu are under different real 
shocks and wages are rigid, then it is better for the two regions to have different 
monetary policies. 
McKinnon (1963) emphasized the role of the degree of openness as a crite- 
rion for the feasibility of the floating regime. Autonomy in conducting mone- 
tary policy is the main merit of floating exchange rates. If a country is too open 
and the role of nontraded goods is minimal, then the merit of an autonomous 
monetary policy will be small because the wage level will immediately adjust 
to the international level. 
Mundell and others (e.g., Ingram 1973) also emphasized the role of factor 
movements. If  labor can move quickly from Hokkaido to Honshu, then unem- 
ployment in Hokkaido is a lesser concern because workers can move to Hon- 
shu. If  funds are easily moved from one place to other, it reduces the problem 
of balance of payments constraints, which could be a limiting factor for macro- 
economic stabilization between regions with sticky wages and prices. 
We  shall examine these three conditions in turn. The first aspect, the impor- 
tance of the synchronization or the dissynchronization of real disturbances for 
the choice of a currency area, is developed by Fukuda and Hamada (1988) in 
the context of a two-country version of the Dornbusch model of exchange rate 
determination. They  showed that  Poole’s (1970) familiar argument for the 
choice of targets for stabilization in the IS-LM model can be extended to the 
discussion of optimal interventions in the exchange market. 
In  a two-country model positing symmetric economic structures, Fukuda 
and Hamada showed, using the technique of Aoki (1981), that the system can 
be decomposed into the system of average variables and difference variables. 
In the system of average variables, that is, in the whole system, Poole’s results 
hold: worldwide demand shocks on IS  can be more effectively handled by 
controlling the average money supply of the world as in McKinnon’s proposal 
for controlling the total money supply of the world. Worldwide shocks on the 
LM curve, on the other hand, can be more effectively handled by controlling 
the average interest rate. 
In the system of difference variables the following results have direct impli- 
cation on the choice of a monetary regime: no or little intervention is needed 
when country-specific disturbances are mainly on the IS curve, including dis- 
turbances due to changing competitiveness in trade; extensive intervention in 
order to slow down the movements of exchange rate, or pegging the exchange 
rate, is desirable when country-specific disturbances are mainly on the LM 
curve. 
The results corresponding to country-specific disturbances can be reinter- 
preted in the context of the choice of  a currency area. Consider a region, a 
group of nations. Economic interactions with the rest of the world can be re- 378  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
garded as regionwide shocks to the system consisting of these economies. The 
basic economic difference between a currency union with fixed exchange rates 
and a floating exchange-rate regime within the region rests on the absence or 
presence of autonomy in macroeconomic policy. By forming a currency union 
these countries indirectly align their price levels with each other. With the 
floating exchange-rate regime, on the other hand, a country can essentially 
choose its own price level. 
Suppose country-specific monetary disturbances affect these countries dif- 
ferently, but country-specific real disturbances hardly affect them, then keep- 
ing price levels aligned among these countries will promote economic stabili- 
zation. If, on the other hand, country-specific real disturbances affect these 
countries differently, but country-specific monetary disturbances hardly affect 
them, then it will be desirable that each country be allowed to conduct indepen- 
dent monetary policy provided that some degree of wage-price rigidity exists. 
It is at least clear from this reasoning that a group of nations will be better off 
not forming a currency union if country-specific real disturbances are preva- 
lent. The reader will see that this is a rather straightforward extension of Mun- 
dell’s argument. 
In the following, we will measure the degree of  synchronization of  real as 
well as monetary disturbances among Asian countries and compare the degree 
of synchronization with that among EC countries. Here again, we rely on the 
principal component method. We  will show that the degree of confluence in 
real disturbances is quite high among Asian nations. A brief explanation of  our 
method follows: 
With regard to real disturbances, we concentrate on disturbances of invest- 
ment behavior because we found that consumption behavior is much more 
stable and that the magnitude of net export is much smaller. We  estimated the 
following investment function first: 
(2)  In I: = a;,  + a;  In <-,  + a;  In q-, + a;  T + E;, where 
4  = investment (in real terms) in country i at time t, 
r :-  1  = interest rate in country i at time t -  1, 
y:-  1  = real GNP in country i at time t- 1, 
T  = time trend, and 
E:  = errorterm. 
Since data for interest rates in Hong Kong were unavailable, we ran ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regressions on annual data (1978-90) from the remaining 
seven Asian countries: Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and  Thailand. We  obtained fairly satisfactory results for most 
countries, with expected signs of coefficients (i.e., all < 0 and a; > 0) and 
with statistical significance. Then, we used the obtained error term (E) as a 
proxy variable for real disturbances in each country. 
For monetary  disturbances, we  estimated the  following money  demand 
function: 379  Economic Preconditions for Asian Regional Integration 
(3) 
M: 
rl:  = errortern, 
and the remaining notations are the same as those in equation (2). We again ran 
OLS regressions on annual data (1977-89) from the seven countries mentioned 
above. Again, for most countries we obtained coefficient estimates with correct 
signs (i.e., p,' < 0 and p,'  > 0) and with statistical significance. We used the 
error term (q)  as a proxy variable for monetary disturbances. 
Then, we performed principal component analysis for the above residuals as 
proxies for real and monetary disturbances. For the purpose of comparison, we 
made similar estimates for the two  sets of  EC countries (see section  14.2 
above) and  for the  Summit countries (the United  States, Japan, Germany, 
France, Italy the United Kingdom, and Canada). 
Table 14.12 shows the contribution of the first three principal components 
to explaining the variance of  real and monetary disturbances. In the case of 
real or IS disturbances, the first principal component explains 46.1 percent of 
the total variance in Asia, whereas it explains less than one-third of the total 
variance in other groups. In particular, in the larger EC countries it explains 
only one-quarter. This shows that investment equations in Asian economies are 
subject to disturbances that are more synchronized than in other regions. 
For monetary shocks, on the other hand, there does not seem to exist a sig- 
nificant difference in the accounting power of the first principal component. 
The theoretical analysis of  Fukuda and Hamada (1988) concludes that syn- 
chronized real disturbances are a good reason to form a currency union. Thus 
our analysis seems to suggest that there are grounds to form a currency union 
in East Asia and that they are at least as good as the reasons for forming one 
In  Mr = p;,  + p; In  r: + p;  In  I: + p;  T + q;,  where 
= real money supply (M,)  in country i at time t and 
Table 14.12  Principal Components (P.C.) Analysis of Macroeconomic 
Disturbances (cumulative  Rz) 
Disturbance  Asiaa  Larger ECb  Smaller EC'  Summitd 
Real disturbance (E) 
First P.C.  0.461  0.259  0.303  0.323 
Second P.C.  0.657  0.49 1  0.575  0.557 
Third P.C.  0.809  0.678  0.747  0.721 
First P.C.  0.410  0.320  0.385  0.331 
Second P.C.  0.634  0.529  0.593  0.543 
Third P.C.  0.772  0.686  0.755  0.724 
Monetary disturbance (I$ 
Source:  See main text for details. 
"Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. 
bGerrnany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands, and Belgium. 
'Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Denmark, Belgium, and Netherlands. 
dUnited States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, and Canada. 380  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
in Europe. The negative correlations between U.S. and Japanese real distur- 
bances and the first principal component in table 14.13 suggest that linking a 
common East Asian currency to the U.S. dollar and the yen may not be nec- 
essary. 
We add the following heuristic remarks on loading factors of principal com- 
ponents of these residuals (see table 14.13): 
1. IS residuals: The first factor may be interpreted as the average part of the 
macroeconomic time series. Every East Asian nation except Korea contributes 
to this factor. This seems to indicate that Korea was subject to different kinds 
of real shocks during this period. (As far as the numbers tell, this might give 
some economic rationale for creating a currency union excluding Korea. We 
are by no means suggesting such a union from this casual finding. Moreover, 
we have to take into account many other aspects, geographical, political, and 
so forth, before proposing a concrete currency union.) The second factor is 
associated with the Philippines and Indonesia. The third principal component 
is dominated by  the influence of Korea. 
2. LM residuals: Loading factors of  the first principal component of  LM 
Table 14.13  Loading Factors of Each Principal Component 
Principal component 
Disturbance and Country  1  2  3 
Real disturbance 
Korea  0.096  0.025  0.992 
Indonesia  0.388  0.662  -0.127 
Malaysia  0.950  0.050  0.043 
Philippines  0.462  0.775  0.090 
Singapore  0.830  -0.467  -0.03 1 
Thailand  0.668  -0.330  0.119 
Taiwan  0.902  -0.063  -0.201 
(USA)’  -0.548  -0.137  -0.146 
(Japan)”  -0.067  -0.395  0.278 
Korea  0.553  0.534  0.466 
Indonesia  0.654  0.060  0.354 
Malaysia  0.853  -0.318  -0.134 
Philippines  0.573  0.563  0.037 
Singapore  0.569  -0.715  -0.098 
Thailand  -0.115  -0.587  0.714 
Taiwan  0.862  -0.053  -0.300 
(USA)’  0.042  -0.468  0.262 
(Japan)’  0.370  -0.186  -0.464 
Monetary disturbance 
Source: See main text for details. 
Correlation coefficients with real and monetary disturbances for the United States and Japan are 
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residuals tell that monetary disturbances in  Thailand move differently from 
those in other East Asian countries. 
Before going into the discussion of the degree of factor mobility, let us look 
briefly at McKinnon’s argument on openness of national economies. The last 
column of table 14.9 indicates that some Asian countries have an extremely 
high degree of openness. This implies that, for example, to make Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Malaysia each a single currency union with a floating rate may 
not be an appropriate choice of monetary regime. Incidentally, the correspond- 
ing figures for EC countries range from very  open countries (Ireland, 141.9 
percent; Belgium-Luxembourg, 14  1.4 percent; and the Netherlands, 106.6 per- 
cent) to fairly closed countries (Spain, 29.3 percent; Italy, 37.1 percent; and 
France, 38.3 percent). 
Now  let us examine the degree of factor mobility, both capital and labor, 
among East Asian nations. As Ingram (1969) pointed out, high mobility of 
production factors is another reason for the formation of a common currency 
area. 
Comprehensive data on labor mobility in East Asia are hard to obtain. Avail- 
able data suggest, however, that there is a high degree of labor mobility among 
East Asian nations, mostly from less-developed ASEAN nations to the more 
industrialized and capital-abundant  NIEs. Table 14.14 shows the degree of la- 
bor inflow in selected countries. In Singapore,  one of the largest labor recipient 
countries in East Asia, the level of inflow of foreign workers was 128,000,  and 
the share of foreign labor in the total labor force was about 10 percent. As the 
table shows, the share of labor inflow in the total labor force in Singapore was 
generally higher than  those in Europe and Japan. Except for Switzerland, 
where the share was as high as 17.48 percent, the share for Singapore was 
higher than any other country in the table, that is, even higher than Germany, 
a major recipient of “guest workers” for many years. Singapore receives many 
foreign workers from neighboring ASEAN countries: Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. In  1989, the share of  workers coming from these 
four countries in  the total labor inflow into Singapore was as high as 83.1 
percent. 
To some East Asian countries, the outflow of labor to foreign countries is 
also important.  For example, in 1987, the Philippines sent about 400,000 work- 
ers to foreign countries, according to the official statistics which generally un- 
derestimate the degree of  labor mobility. The outflow of  labor amounted to 
about 2 percent of the total labor force in the Philippines. While most of these 
workers were directed to the Middle East, about 100,000 (or one-fourth of the 
labor outflow) went to Asian countries. 
The degree of  capital mobility is also high among East Asian countries. 
Table 14.15 compares the ratio of the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
to GNP in ASEAN countries with ratios for major developed countries. Except 
for the Philippines, which has been suffering from economic difficulties since 
the middle of  the  1980s, the ratio of  FDI  inflow to GNP is higher in the 382  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
Table 14.14  Share of Foreign Workers in Labor Force, 1986 

























Sources: Goto (1990); Japanese Ministry of Labor, Kaigai Rodo Josei (Annual Report of  Overseas 
Economy), 199  I. 
"For Singapore, figure used is for 1989. 
Table 14.15  Ratio of Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment to GNP, 1989' (%) 

















Sources: Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Ourlook, 1991 ;  U.S. Department of Com- 
merce, Survey of  Current Business (Washington, D.C., various issues); IMF, International Finan- 
cial Statistics (Washington, D.C., various issues). 
"For developed countries, data used is for 1988. 
ASEAN countries than in major developed countries. The figures for Malaysia 
(8.97 percent ) and Thailand (11.73 percent) are especially high. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that the major part of FDI inflow to these countries comes 
from neighboring Asian countries. The shares of FDI from Asian countries 
(from Japan in parentheses) in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thai- 
land, are 41.7 (16.3) percent, 72.9 (3  1.1) percent, 59.8 (19.7) percent, and 69.2 
(44.1) percent, respectively. 
Thus, although the data are fairly limited, the above examples suggest a high 
degree of factor mobility among East Asian countries. This could be another 
rationale for creating a common currency area in East Asia. 
14.5  Concluding Remarks 
We have offered an  overview of the conditions that are favorable or unfavor- 
able for the formation of an FTA and of  a currency union in Asia. Our method 383  Economic Preconditions for Asian Regional Integration 
is descriptive and our finding suggestive rather than decisive. By referring to 
many statistical indicators from various angles, however, we hope we  have 
provided a fairly comprehensive view of the conditions for economic integra- 
tion in Asia. We can summarize our findings as follows: 
The degree of interdependence among Asian nations through trade and fac- 
tor movements is substantial. It  might not have progressed much  in recent 
years, as Frankel (1991) points out. However, some indicators show a higher 
degree of interdependence among Asian countries than among the EC coun- 
tries that are about to form an integrated market. Thus, preconditions for an 
FTA seem to be met among Asian countries. At the same time, our study of the 
trade dependence index reveals that it is not advisable to allow the formation of 
an FTA that would hinder trade with the United States or Japan, as Asian na- 
tions are highly dependent upon these two countries. One of the reasons the 
Mahathir plan to create an FTA without the participation of the United States 
was brought to a deadlock could be the high degree of Asian economic depen- 
dence on the American economy. From this angle, some justification may be 
found for the seemingly premature and self-centered reaction of  the United 
States in strongly opposing the EAEG plan despite its own move toward the 
NAFTA. 
As for the desirability of a common currency area, we have studied several 
indicators: the synchronization of  real disturbances emphasized by  Mundell 
(1961) and Fukuda and Hamada (1988), the openness of Asian countries em- 
phasized by McKinnon (1963), and the degree of capital and labor mobility 
emphasized by Ingram (1973) and Mundell (1961). All of  these indicators 
seem to suggest that a case can be made for a currency union in Asia, even 
though it is not clear whether the common currency should be linked to a major 
currency such as the dollar or the yen. 
We  can extend the present research in various directions. For example, we 
may  ask what the consequences of  the European integration will be for the 
Asian economy, and what the consequences of  Asian economic integration 
would be for the rest of  the world. We  may  also examine the way  in which 
Asian nations can exploit their possible strategic positions in this world where 
movements toward economic blocs are gaining momentum. Our findings indi- 
cate that conditions in Asia are at least as favorable to economic integration as 
those in already-unifying Europe. 
During  its  notorious formation  of  the  Greater  East  Asia  Co-prosperity 
sphere that ended in the Second World War, Japan attempted to implement a 
scheme of mobilizing goods and resources within the region. At the same time, 
it attempted to create a yen bloc in East Asia in two ways. In one form, Japan 
issued military scrip-for  example, in the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, 
and Burma-from  the Southern Development Credit Vault, a kind of overseas 
military bank. This process implied direct economic confiscation from Asian 
nations of  the  seigniorage right. In  the other  form, Japan  created central 
banks-for  example, in Manchuria and North and South China-that  issued 384  Junichi Goto and Koichi Hamada 
Table 14.16  Money Supply and Price Indices of Territories Occupied by Japan during 
World War I1 
Money Supply (million) 
Central Bank Note  Military Scrip 
Manchuria  North China  South China  Singapore  Philippines  Indonesia  Burma 
Year and Month  (yuan)  (yuan)  (yuan)  (dollar)  (peso)  (guilder)  (lupee) 
1941.12  1,262  956  280 
1942.12  1,669  1,593  3,696 
1943.9  2,121  2,552  11,798  385  348  537  497 
1943.12  3,011  3,762  19,150  482  513  674  685 
1944.12  5,877  15,841  139,699  1,512  4,874  1,976  2,832 
1945.8  8,158  93,585  2,277,179  5,650  6,150  3,880  5,654 
Price Index (1941.12 = 100) 
Changchun  Beijing  Shanghai  Singapore  Manila  Jakarta  Rangoon 
1942.12  112  158  206  352  200  134  705 
1943.12  122  267  671  1,201  1,196  227  1,718 
1944.12  162  892  5,707  10,766  14,285  1,279  8,707 
1945.8  -  17,273  7,189  35,000  14,285  3,197  185,647 
Source: Nakamura (1989, 31). 
regional currencies that were pegged at par with the yen. Through the mone- 
tary expansion by these central banks, these regions suffered tremendous in- 
flation. Japanese war merchants exporting goods to these areas earned profits 
from the inflation, and by  their privilege they  could convert their regional 
profits into the yen at par. Table 14.16 illustrates this. 
This clearly tells us that there is a great distance between designating one 
region a suitable common currency area and actually implementing a common 
currency  union.  The question  of  seigniorage should  be  cleared, and  the 
political-economy aspect cannot be neglected. This paper will be merely a 
modest, preliminary step to these goals, if  a currency union is ever to be con- 
trived in Asia. 
References 
Adelman, I., and C. T.  Moms. 1967. Society, politics, and economic development: A 
Aoki, M. 1981. Dynamic analysis of  open economies. New York: Academic Press. 
Frankel, J. 1991. Is a yen bloc forming in Pacific Asia. In Finance and rhe international 
economy:  The AMEX Bank Review prize essays, ed. R. O'Brien. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
quantitative approach. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. 385  Economic Preconditions for Asian Regional Integration 
. 1992.  Is Japan creating a yen bloc in East Asia and the Pacific? Paper prepared 
for the NBER conference on Japan and the U.S. in Pacific Area. 
Fukuda, S., and K. Hamada. 1988. Towards the implementation of  desirable rules of 
monetary coordination and intervention. Economic Growth Center Paper no. 411, 
Yale University. 
Goto, J. 1990. Gaikokujin Rod0 no Keizaigaku (An economic analysis of migrant work- 
ers). (In Japanese.) Tokyo: The Oriental Economist, Ltd. 
Helpman, E., and A. Razin. 1979. Towards a consistent comparison of alternative ex- 
change rate systems. Canadian Journal of  Economics 12:394-409. 
Ingram, J. C.  1969. Some implications of Puerto Rican experience. In International 
Finance, ed. R. N. Cooper. Middlesex: Penguin Books. 
. 1973. The case for European monetary  integration. Essays in International 
Finance, no. 98. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Kaufman, L. and P.  Rousseeuw. 1990. Finding groups in data: An introduction to clus- 
ter analysis. New York: Wiley. 
Lucas, R. E., Jr.  1982. Interest rates and currency prices in a two-country world. Journal 
of Monetary Economics 10:335-59. 
Mahalanobis P.  C. 1936. On the generalized distance in statistics. Proceedings of  Na- 
tional Institute of Science of India 12:49-55. 
McKinnon, R. 1963. Optimum currency area. American Economic Review 53:717-24. 
Mundell, R.  1961. The theory of  optimum currency areas. American  Economic Re- 
view 51:657-64. 
Nakamura, T. 1989. Keikakuka to Minshuka (Planning and democratization). Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten. 
Naya, S., and M. Plummer. 1989. AUI background papers: Research contributions to 
the ASEAN-US. initiative. Honolulu: East-West Center. 
Poole, W.  1970. Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic 
macro model. Quarterly Journal of  Economics 84. 
Stone, R. 1945. The analysis of market demand. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
ser. A, 108:286-382. 
Yamazawa, I., A. Hirata, and K. Yokota, 1991.  Evolving pattern of comparative advan- 
tage in the Pacific economies. In The Pac$c  economy: Growth and external stability, 
ed. M. Ariff. New York: Allen & Unwin. 
COIllllleIlt  Masao Satake 
Goto and Hamada’s paper provides not only a useful empirical fact but also a 
stimulating discussion of economic integration for East Asia. The economic 
feasibility of integration for this region urgently requires analysis, so this paper 
can be regarded as one of the early and important contributions in this field. 
The authors’ main findings can be summarized as follows: First, East Asian 
countries are very closely interrelated, in some respects more closely than are 
the EC countries; second, in terms of  macroeconomic variables, East Asian 
countries have similar economic structures, in some cases more similar than 
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those of  EC countries. From these observations the authors hypothesize that 
the preconditions for Asian economic integration are met. 
Two types of integration are considered in this paper: the creation of a free 
trade area (FTA) and of an optimum currency area. My comment concerns only 
the problems involved in the FTA idea for this region because my comparative 
advantage lies there. 
The authors make three remarks based on the analysis of trade intensity in 
tables 14.6-14.8  in  section 14.3. First, East Asian nations are more closely 
related than EC nations. This is obtained from tables 14.6 and 14.7, where the 
trade intensity indices among the East Asian countries are higher on average 
than that in the European Community. Second, it is not clear from table 14.8 
whether the  degree of  interdependence among East  Asian  nations has  in- 
creased throughout the 1980s. Third, it is expected that the interrelationship in 
this area will become stronger in the 1990s because of political developments 
toward an FTA. 
The first claim, as the authors note, contrasts with the assertion by Frankel 
and Wei’s paper in this volume (chap. 12). According to table  12.12 in the 
paper by Frankel and Wei, the ratio of intraregional trade to total trade among 
East Asian nations is much lower than that among EC nations. And even the 
rise in the 1980s from 33 to 37 percent is due only to economic expansion, 
rather than to real integration. How do we explain these different results, and 
which region can we say is more closely intrarelated? There are some obvious 
differences in the two indexes. 
In particular, the trade intensity index presents a bilateral relationship, while 
the intraregional trade to total trade ratio is obtained from aggregate data of 
trade in the region. However, it must be noted that, besides this difference, the 
nature of trade intensity tends to make each East Asian country’s index higher 
than that in the European Community. The denominator of the trade intensity 
index TITw  is country j’s share of world trade. This denominator may be lower 
in East Asia than in the European Community, because the value of  trade in 
the  former  may  be  smaller  than  in  the  latter.  Unless  the  numerator 
TJT differs significantly between the two regions, trade intensity is likely to 
be higher among the East Asian countries. Considering the nature of  trade 
intensity, we must be careful when using it to compare the degree of interrela- 
tionship among regions or countries of different regions. 
As for the future of intraregional trade among East Asian countries, I have 
a different view from the authors. We can see from table 12.12 in the paper by 
Frankel and Wei that in the 1980s  East Asia’s interregional trade with the Euro- 
pean Community and North America expanded faster than intraregional trade. 
I think that this diversification of trading partners will continue because of the 
rapid industrialization of East Asia, unless the other two regions-the  Euro- 
pean Community and North America-become  “a strong fortress.” 
In  the latter part of  section 14.3, Goto and Hamada show that the rate of 
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will be an enormous boon to this region. I agree with this point, but an  FTA is 
not the only policy option for trade liberalization. It is important to compare it 
with the nondiscriminatory form of  liberalization. If  it is true that this region 
is very closely intrarelated, liberalization on a nondiscriminatory basis will not 
increase imports from outside, and therefore it may be a better policy alterna- 
tive than an FTA (Drysdale and Garnaut 1989,230-31). 
My last comment relates to the question of  whether the FTA  proposal in- 
cludes the United States and Japan. I agree with the authors’ assertion that it 
would be infeasible as well as unprofitable for East Asian nations to form an 
FTA  without the United States and Japan. But can an expanded region that 
includes the United States and Japan still keep the close relationships, as well 
as the homogeneity in terms of macroeconomic variables, analyzed in the first 
part of the paper? 
In conclusion, it may be true that the East Asian countries are very closely 
interrelated, like those of the European Community. But I think that this does 
not necessarily lead to an economic justification of  an East Asian free trade 
area. 
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COlllIIlent  Toshiaki Tachibanaki 
Goto and Hamada’s paper is interesting and useful because it reveals the possi- 
bility of Asian regional integration in economic activities. The basic reason for 
proposing such an  integration is that the degree of interdependence among 
Asian nations is high, and even higher in some respects than among EC coun- 
tries. I would like to offer two major comments and several minor comments. 
The two major comments are as follows. 
First, I find  that  Goto and  Hamada’s empirical  work  is not  convincing 
enough to conclude that the degree of interdependence among Asian nations 
is high. I am concerned with the definition of the East Asian countries. Goto 
and Hamada consider only Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, In- 
donesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Those countries are chosen, 
according to the authors’ statement, because data reliability in those countries 
is high. We see many Asian countries missing-for  example, mainland China, 
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North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei, and some others- 
in all, about ten countries. Some countries are socialist, others are developing 
countries. However, there are no strong reasons for excluding these countries 
from their statistical examination. 
This causes a sample selection bias. It  may  be possible to show that the 
authors chose the countries which already have a high degree of interdepen- 
dence. In other words, the countries where reasonably reliable data are avail- 
able are already semideveloped and are already interdependent. If all countries 
in East Asia were included in the sample, the degree of interdependence might 
not be so high. In fact, Jeffrey Frankel’s (1991) paper suggested a low degree 
of interdependence, as mentioned by Goto and Hamada. Therefore, the choice 
of countries is crucial for the examination of interdependence in any region. 
The second major comment concerns the role of  Japan in Asian regional 
integration. Japan might be relatively too strong, if  Asia were integrated eco- 
nomically. My  guess is that if  one country in any regional integration is too 
strong, the integration will not work very well. We can see an example in the 
role of the United States in the Central, and possibly South, American regions, 
where regional integration does not work well. Even in Europe, where eco- 
nomic integration is anticipated, several smaller countries such as Denmark 
are somewhat reluctant to integrate and may prefer independence rather than 
regional integration for fear of the power of big countries. 
Another reason Asian regional integration, embracing Japan, is not desirable 
at this stage is that the memory of  the Second World War has not yet disap- 
peared in Asia, in particular the memory of Japanese military aggression. This 
memory will fade when the generation changes, though it is impossible to ex- 
pect it to disappear entirely. Now, however, it is too early to argue for Asian 
regional integration. Japan may also be unwelcome in Asia because of its cur- 
rent status of economic superpower. In sum, we need more careful discussion 
about Asian regional integration if Japan is to be included. 
I add several minor comments. First, the authors chose five key macroeco- 
nomic variables to conduct the principal component analysis. I would prefer 
more detail about the reasons these five variables were chosen. Second, in sec- 
tion 14.4 there is a proposition that factor mobility in labor and capital in Asia 
is high. However, only Singapore is picked up as an example of labor mobility. 
The degree of factor mobility must be evaluated by considering many countries 
in Asia. 
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